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This paper explores how fiscal incentives affect capital tax decisions by local 
governments in the Chinese context. We develop a model in which local governments, 
facing different fiscal incentives, compete for mobile capital over corporate taxes. The 
key prediction of the model, borne out in data from Chinese cities over the years 2004-
2013, is that an increase in the local corporate income tax-sharing ratio, proxying local 
fiscal incentives, makes city governments’ horizontal tax reactions stronger. Our results 
contribute to the fiscal federalism literature by providing evidence in support of the 
argument that fiscal incentives faced by local governments significantly shape their 
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policy choices. Additionally, we provide explicit evidence on local tax competition 
within provinces in China, which has long been regarded as one of the driving forces 
of China’s rapid economic growth. 
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The nexus of fiscal decentralization and economic development has long been debated 
in the fiscal federalism literature. Recent studies emphasize the role of local 
governments under decentralized economies (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). In 
particular, fiscal incentives faced by local governments are deemed to have strong 
influences in shaping local policy choices, and consequently local economic 
development (Weingast, 2009).  
This fiscal incentive hypothesis underlines the importance of local revenue 
generation. It is argued that fiscal arrangements allowing local governments to capture 
a large portion of local revenue are generally correlated with faster economic growth. 
This is because local governments care about revenue, and hence they tend to 
contemplate how best to generate revenue and take measures to maximize it in response 
to different fiscal arrangements (Oi, 1992, 1999; Jin et al., 2005; Goron and Li, 2012). 
Thus, a high tax revenue retention rate motivates local governments to promote 
economic development to obtain more revenue. 
The existing empirical literature has provided either direct or indirect evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. For instance, Careaga and Weingast (2003) find that 
marginal revenue retention rates for local governments in Mexico are positively 
associated with real GDP growth in the country for the period 1980-1995. Singh and 
Srinivasan (2006) point out that local governments raising a larger portion of their own 
revenue have more incentives to stimulate the growth of tax revenue, which in turn 
stimulates local economic development in India. Indirect evidence from other federal 
countries such as Russia also shows that economic growth tends to be slow in countries 
lacking local incentives (Zhuravskaya, 2000). Many scholars have examined the case 




Jin et al. (2005) show that China’s fiscal contracting system in the 1980s provided local 
governments with strong fiscal incentives. During this period, a high overall economic 
growth was maintained, while provincial governments on average retained 89 percent 
of the additional tax revenues generated within their borders, and 68 percent of all 
provinces enjoyed a marginal retention rate of 100 percent. Consequently, subnational 
governments were inclined to provide market-enhancing public goods, to attenuate 
rent-seeking activities, and to be less corrupt (Oi, 1992, 1999; Weingast, 1995; Qian 
and Weingast, 1997). In addition, by exploiting an exogenous change in the 
intergovernmental revenue-sharing scheme in China, Han and Kung (2015) investigate 
in detail how the change in fiscal incentives for local governments induced them to shift 
their efforts from boosting industrialization to facilitating urbanization. Along the same 
lines, in this paper we study how local fiscal incentives might affect the extent of tax 
competition among local governments, and hence the choice of local tax policies in 
China. 
China provides a unique institutional setting to study this issue. Tax legislation in 
China is highly centralized, with the central authority stipulating the uniform tax-
sharing rules between the central and provincial governments. However, provincial 
governments have been granted substantial discretion in determining their own tax-
sharing rules within their borders, which has actually given rise to a high level of 
variation in sub-provincial policy. This variation is so substantial that it creates varied 
fiscal incentives for local governments, significantly shaping local government 
behavior across provinces. Thus, we take advantage of this variation across provinces 
to examine how fiscal incentives in a province may affect the extent of local tax 




crucial factor in explaining the rapid economic growth in China (Xu, 2011; Liu and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). 
To proceed, we first build a simple theoretical model under the tax competition 
framework to establish the linkage between the local tax-sharing ratio (a proxy of fiscal 
incentives faced by local governments) and the extent of local tax competition within 
provinces. We find that, in equilibrium, there exists a positive tax reaction function in 
the setting of local tax policies, and an increase in the local tax-sharing ratio tends to 
strengthen local jurisdictions’ horizontal tax reactions. Empirically, we employ 
prefecture-city level panel data for the years 2004-2013 and a spatial lag model to test 
the prediction, where we find supporting evidence for it.  
Our findings contribute to the literature in two aspects. First, we provide explicit 
evidence in support of the fiscal incentives hypothesis—fiscal incentives faced by local 
governments significantly shape their policy choices. While this hypothesis has been 
well discussed in the theoretical literature about fiscal federalism (see Weingast (2009) 
for a detailed review), few empirical studies have examined it rigorously. We 
complement this work by looking at how fiscal incentives may shape local government 
tax policies, which, in turn, also reveals a novel explanation for the observed 
heterogeneous tax polices across localities in China. Second, we are among the first to 
provide empirical evidence on local tax competition within provinces in China. Tax 
competition has long been regarded as one of the driving forces of China’s rapid 
economic growth. However, most existing studies have mainly focused on tax 
competition across provinces (e.g., Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). Given that it is 
actually lower level governments (i.e., prefectural and county governments) that have 




examination of tax competition at the local level should provide a better picture for 
understanding this issue.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background 
on the fiscal institutions in China. Section 3 establishes a simple tax competition model 
and derives the main theoretical prediction. Section 4 develops the empirical 
methodology and discusses the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
China has maintained a hierarchical structure of governance since the formation of its current 
system in 1949. Currently, there are five levels of governments in China. Starting with the 
highest, these levels are the center, provinces, prefecture-level cities (hereafter, cities), 
counties, and townships. Under the hierarchical system, each subnational level of government 
is wholly subordinate to the next higher order of government. Thus, intergovernmental fiscal 
relationships are typically defined and implemented between the government at the 
corresponding level and its immediate upper level of government (i.e., center-managing-
province, province-managing-others). In the meantime, general fiscal arrangements are only 
clearly defined between the central and province levels, while sub-provincial fiscal 
arrangements are not formalized by any laws or regulations. Instead, the central government 
grants provincial governments the discretion to set up their own intergovernmental fiscal 
relationships within the provinces. Practically, provincial governments have mostly followed 




Vazquez et al., 2008). Thus, this institutional setup implies many different fiscal arrangements 
at the sub-provincial level depending on the specific province. 
More specifically, the Chinese government implemented the tax-sharing system (TSS) 
reform in 1994. During the reform, all taxes were categorized into three categories: central 
taxes, local taxes, and shared taxes between the central and provincial governments. While 
central taxes are entirely retained by the central government, local taxes are exclusively 
obtained by local governments within the provinces.2 Being the most important sources of 
revenue for the Chinese governments, the value-added taxes (VAT) and income taxes 
(including personal and corporate income taxes) are shared proportionally between the 
central government and provincial governments. In particular, the TSS reform defined the VAT 
sharing ratio as 75% to the central government and 25% to provincial governments. The 
sharing rule of income taxes between the central government and provincial governments has 
undergone two adjustments in 2002 and 2003, respectively. That is, the central government 
assigned to itself 50% of income taxes before 2002 and raised this ratio to 60% in 2003, with 
the rest allocated to provincial governments. Furthermore, the 1994 TSS reform only explicitly 
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VAT (75% central: 25% local ), personal and enterprise income taxes (50:50 in 2002; 60:40 from 
2003), excise and urban infrastructure taxes (rail transportation as well as headquarters of banks and 
insurance companies 100% central, others 100% local), resource taxes (offshore 100% central, on land 




stipulated the tax sharing rules between the central government and provincial governments, 
leaving discretion for provincial governments to specify their own sharing rules for revenue 
retained at the sub-provincial level (including city, county, and township governments). In 
practice, the retained shared taxes (including 25% of the total VAT and 40% of total income 
tax) are usually shared in ad hoc negotiation ratios between provincial and sub-provincial 
governments across different provinces.3 In Figure 1, we depict the average value of the 
corporate income tax-sharing ratio at the sub-provincial level across provinces for the sample 
period 2004-2013. As shown, the average retaining ratio at the sub-provincial level varied 
significantly across provinces, with a minimum value of 0.141 in Yunnan province and a 
maximum value of 0.332 in Zhejiang province. Thus, the great variation in tax-sharing ratios 
across provinces generates different fiscal incentives for local governments within the 
provinces, which significantly shapes local tax policies.  
 
3. A Simple Model 
Consider an economy consisting of two regions i and j. In each region, the local 
government chooses a tax rate 𝑡𝑖 levied on mobile capital, which eventually determines 
the allocation of capital across regions. The economy implements a tax-sharing system 
where both regions share a proportion 𝜆 of their tax revenues.  
In particular, we assume that each region has an immobile (representative) resident, 
who owns identical endowments with fixed amounts of an immobile factor (e.g., land 
or labor) ?̅? and fixed amounts of mobile capital ?̅?. The production function in region i 
is given by 𝐹𝑖 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖), where 𝐾𝑖 is the amount of mobile capital and 𝐿𝑖 is the 
                                                          




amount of a fixed production factor, such as labor or land. For analytical convenience, 
the fixed factor is normalized to unity and the production function can be simplified as 
𝑓(𝑘𝑖), which is increasing, twice continuously differentiable, and concave in the level 






2. Without loss of generality, we follow Bucovetsky 
(1991) and Hindriks et al. (2008) to assume a quadratic specification of the production, 
which is well behaved over its increasing range and allows us to introduce several 
simplifications. Specifically, the production function is given by 





,     (1) 
where 𝛽 is the rate of decline of the marginal product of capital with the amount of 
capital invested in the region; technology parameter 𝛼 is assumed to be sufficiently 
large relative to 𝛽, which ensures a positive level of production and the standard 
properties of the production function. 
Since capital is perfectly mobile across regions, the market clearing condition 










 denotes the marginal production of capital and 𝑡𝑖 is the capital tax rate levied 
by region i. With equation (1) and the condition 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗 = 2𝑘, we can solve (2) for the 
capital allocated in jurisdiction i: 
𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘 +
𝑡𝑗−𝑡𝑖
2𝛽
.     (3) 
As indicated, the stock of capital in region i is decreasing in its own tax rate 𝑡𝑖 and 
increasing in the tax rate of the other region 𝑡𝑗. To complete the model, we assume the 




revenue, and some combination of the two. That is, the objective function 𝑊𝑖 of region 
i is the sum of private income and local tax revenue:  
𝑊𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖(𝑘𝑖) −
∂𝑓𝑖
∂𝑘𝑖




𝑘𝑖 is the return to the immobile factor (i.e., private income) and 
𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑘𝑖 represents local tax revenues, with 𝜆𝑖 (0≤ 𝜆𝑖 ≤ 1) being the capital tax-sharing 
ratio for local government i.  
The problem of each region is to choose its capital tax rate 𝑡𝑖 so as to maximize its 
objective function (4), subject to the capital allocation rule specified in equation (3). 






𝑘𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖(𝑘𝑖 −
𝑡𝑖
2𝛽
) = 0.    (5) 
Taking the derivative of 
∂𝑊𝑖
∂𝑡𝑖
 with respect to 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑡𝑗, respectively, and applying 







.    (6) 
Apparently, the slope of the tax reaction function of the regions depends on the 










2 > 0.      (7) 
In sum, equations (6) and (7) provide the following proposition for empirical 
estimations. 
 
Proposition 1. (i) There exists a strategic interaction of local tax rates between 
regions; (ii) An increase in the local tax-sharing ratio, 𝜆𝑖, will increase the sensitivity 





Intuitively, local governments react strategically in the setting of their tax policies 
because when region j increases its tax rate, it alleviates the competitive pressure on 
region i as this decision reduces the incentive of capital to relocate from i to j. 
Furthermore, a larger value of 𝜆𝑖 implies a higher retained rate of tax revenues at the 
local level, and hence a stronger incentive for the region to utilize tax policy to influence 
capital flow for a large tax base. Correspondingly, in the Chinese context, this 
theoretical exercise conveys a clear message that fiscal incentives, in the form of local 
tax sharing ratios, set by provincial governments (𝜆𝑖) do contribute to asymmetric tax 
policy responses across localities within provinces. In the subsequent sections, we 
utilize data from China for empirical evidence. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology and Data  
To test this theoretical prediction, which is explicitly summarized in Proposition 1, we 
rely on a panel dataset of prefecture-level cities over the period of 2004-2013 to conduct 
empirical estimations.  
4.1. Econometric Specification  
Tax competition theory suggests that the tax rate of city i in the year t is a reaction 
function of its neighboring cities’ tax rates. We therefore employ a spatial lag 
specification in the most general form that has been widely used in the previous 
empirical research on tax competition (Devereux et al., 2008; Jacobs et al., 2010; 
Klemm and Van Parys, 2012): 




where 𝜏𝑖𝑡 is the effective corporate income tax rate of city 𝑖 in year 𝑡, measured as the 
ratio of total corporate income taxes to GDP.4 𝑇𝑆𝑝𝑡 is the corporate income tax sharing 
rate at the sub-provincial level in province p, to which city 𝑖 is subordinate; since the 
tax-sharing rule at the sub-provincial level is the same for all cities within a province, 
we calculate it as the ratio of total retained corporate income tax revenues for all sub-
provincial governments to total corporate income tax revenues generated in that 
province. 𝜏−𝑖𝑡 denotes the weighted average of corporate income tax rates of all other 
cities, 𝑗, in the same province as p, i.e., 𝜏−𝑖𝑡 = ∑
𝑗≠𝑖
𝜔𝑖𝑗𝜏𝑗𝑡. Following the standard 
practice of the spatial econometrics literature, we define the exogenous weights as the 
inverse distance between the cities (i.e., 
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
) and normalize them so that the summation 







. 𝜏−𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑆𝑝𝑡, is the interaction term 
between the weighted average tax rate and the local corporate income tax sharing ratio; 
𝜂𝑖 is city-specific fixed effects, to allow for unexplained heterogeneity across 
prefectures that are constant over time; 𝑡𝑡𝑡 is a linear time trend; and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. Thus, a confirmation of Proposition 1 would predict a 
significant coefficient for 𝛼 and a positive and significant coefficient for 𝛽.  
𝐗𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables that may influence the selection of (effective) 
corporate income tax rates by local governments based on the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature. These include real GDP per capita, the share of secondary industry 
in GDP, openness, urbanization, and population density. Real GDP per capita serves as 
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a measure of income level. Higher incomes are generally related to greater demand for 
public services that may ultimately affect a city’s choice of tax policies. The share of 
secondary industry to GDP captures the effect of economic structure. Openness, 
measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, points to the exposure of a city 
to trade and competition for capital. Finally, urbanization, defined as the share of urban 
population in the total population, and population density represent local demographic 
characteristics that may characterize a city’s special needs for public goods and hence 
tax policies.  
4.2. Estimation  
In the estimation of specification (8), tax policies of the competitors enter 
contemporaneously, so that the competitors’ tax decisions are endogenous and 
correlated with the error term (𝜖𝑖𝑡), which yields biased and inconsistent results if OLS 
or fixed effect estimators are applied (Anselin, 1988). To circumvent this problem, we 
employ an instrumental variables approach that has been used quite often in the recent 
studies on tax competition (e.g., Foucault et al., 2008; Jacobs et al., 2010; Klemm and 
Van Parys, 2012). That is, we use the competitors’ weighted real GDP per capita, 
weighted share of secondary industry to GDP, weighted openness, weighted 
urbanization, and weighted population density as exogenous instruments for the spatial 
lag variable (𝜏−𝑖𝑡) in specification (8).  
Additionally, in the estimations we include a linear time trend that captures a 
common trend for all cities, rather than time dummies. This is because the inclusion of 
time dummies in a model with spatial lag variables results in a possible multicollinearity 
issue among the spatial lag variables and the time dummies, which makes it hard to 






The panel dataset we use for the quantitative analysis covers 279 prefecture-level cities in 
China for the years 2004-2013. We exclude the four province-level municipality cities, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing, as the legal status of these municipalities is non-comparable 
to other regular cities. Cities in Tibet are also excluded from the sample because of data 
unavailability. Given the significant change in the corporate income tax-sharing rule in 2003 
at the central-provincial level, we select 2004 as the starting period in our analysis.  
Data used for the calculations of the key variables are taken from various issues of the 
China City Statistical Yearbooks, the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, and the 
China Taxation Yearbooks. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detailed description and 
sources of all the variables, while their summary statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Main Results  
Table 2 presents the estimation results for our main specification (8). To begin with, we 
estimate the model by using a fixed effects approach assuming no endogeneity issue of 
the spatial lag variable (i.e., the weighted average tax rates). Columns (1) and (2) report 
the corresponding results from estimations controlling and not for the linear time trend. 
Consistent with the prediction of Proposition 1(i), we find a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for the competitors’ weighted average tax rates, suggesting the 
existence of tax competition among city governments within the provinces. 
Additionally, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between the weighted 




confirming Proposition 1(ii) in the sense that a larger share of corporate income tax at 
the sub-provincial level strengthens tax competition among city governments.  
However, these results from the fixed effects estimations are very likely to be 
biased due to the fact that the competitors’ weighted average tax rate is endogenous. 
Therefore, we now resort to the instrumental variables estimations, where the 
competitors’ weighted average tax policy 𝜏−𝑖𝑡 is instrumented by the competitors’ 
weighted average for the explanatory variables. The results are reported in Columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 2. As shown, the estimated coefficients of the key variables of interest, 
the weighted average tax rate and its interaction term with the local tax sharing ratio, 
both remain positive and statistically significant. This suggests that our theoretical 
prediction still holds true. Quantitatively, the estimated coefficient of the weighted 
average tax rates is around 0.6 in all specifications, which is well below one, hence 
ensuring the stationarity of the spatial lag model. The magnitude of the interaction term 
becomes quantitatively larger when the endogeneity concern of the weighted average 
of tax rates is controlled for.  
While the results obtained above are clearly informative, they remain somewhat limited. 
After all, the results do not directly indicate the net slope of the tax rate reaction function 
over the range of the local corporate income tax sharing ratio.5 Therefore, based on our 
preferred specification in Column (4) of Table 2, we graphically illustrate in Figure 2 the net 
slope of the tax reaction function across the observed range of local tax sharing ratio. The 
solid sloping line indicates how the net slope of the tax reaction function changes as the local 
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corporate income tax sharing ratio increases, while the two dashed lines represent the 95% 
confidence intervals. As shown, the net slope of the tax reaction is positive and statistically 
significant over the entire range of the local tax sharing ratio, confirming the existence of 
strong tax competition across localities within provinces.  
For the other control variables, the estimated coefficient of real GDP per capita in Column 
(4) of Table 2 is negative, potentially suggesting that richer cities might be capable of offering 
more tax credits and/or other benefits to compete for capital. The share of secondary industry 
in GDP has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, which may reflect the simple fact 
that corporate income taxes are mainly collected from the secondary sector. Finally, 
openness, urbanization, and population density are all positively correlated with the effective 
corporate income tax rate, yet they are generally not statistically significant in our estimations.  
5.2. Robustness 
In order to test for the robustness of the main results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis 
along two dimensions. First, we employ three alternative weighting matrices that are 
beyond the geographical criteria initially proposed by Devereux et al. (2008) to define 
tax competition patterns among cities within a province. These include uniform weights 
(i.e., the simple average of all other cities in the province); weights based on the size of 





; and weights intended to simultaneously capture the geographical 













In the second dimension we exploit two alternative subsamples that are restricted 
so as to be more comparable, and hence, less likely to be subject to certain 
heterogeneous effects. First, we exclude from the sample cities located in minority 
autonomous provinces. In these provinces, minority ethnic groups make up the 
majority of total population, and so the primary policy objective of these provincial 
governments tends to be pursuing social stability by reducing ethnic conflict, rather 
than pursing local economic growth through tax competition. Second, we restrict our 
estimations to a reduced sample size that excludes the capital city of each province. The 
rationale here is that the legal status of a capital city is not really comparable to other 
prefecture cities in the same province since they may differ dramatically in terms of 
administrative and fiscal status. In addition, since provincial governments are 
physically located in capital cities and since these cities are also generally endowed 
with the best economic and political resources for development, we expect that capital 
cities may be less involved in competition with other prefecture cities.  
Tables 3 and 4 present the corresponding estimation results for the robustness 
check. As shown, in all estimations, our main results remain mostly unchanged—the 
weighed tax rate of the competitors is positively and significantly associated with the 
effective tax rate of a city, and the estimated coefficient of the interaction term is also 
persistently positive. This confirms our main argument in the paper that there exists 
strong tax competition among local governments within provinces in China, and the 
extent of the competition tends to be strengthened by a higher level of fiscal incentives 








6. Concluding Remarks 
The fiscal decentralization literature has emphasized that fiscal incentives play an 
important role in shaping local government behaviors and thereby affecting local 
economic performance. Our paper aims to provide supporting evidence for this by 
studying how local tax competition in China may be affected by the tax-sharing rules 
set up by provincial governments. To this end, we first build a simple tax competition 
model to show that the slope of the tax rate reaction function among local jurisdictions 
is increasing with the local tax sharing ratio. We then test this theoretical hypothesis by 
using a spatial lag model and a city-level panel dataset for the period 2004-2013. Our 
results indicate that positively strategic tax interactions exist among city governments 
within provinces and that an increase in the tax sharing ratio at the sub-provincial level 
intensifies the detected strategic tax interaction among city governments. These results 
largely support our theoretical predictions. 
Our findings have significant policy implications. First, tax competition among 
subnational governments is often considered to be a crucial factor in explaining the 
rapid economic growth in China. Evidence on the existence of inter-jurisdictional tax 
competition, however, is still rare, and much of the evidence is at the cross-provincial 
level. Our study, thus, complements the literature with evidence on local tax 
competition within provinces. Second, if rigorous tax competition among localities and 
the associated distortion of local tax policies is deemed undesirable by national 
authorities, there will be a need to recentralize the tax-sharing rules to organize fiscal 
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Figure 1. Mean of Local Corporate Income Tax (CIT) Sharing Ratio (2004-2013) 
Note: Local corporate income tax is defined as the ratio of total retained corporate income tax 
revenues for all sub-provincial governments to total corporate income tax revenues generated in that 
province. 































































































































































































Figure 2. Estimated slope of tax reaction function conditional on local CIT sharing ratio  
Note: These slopes are calculated basing on specification (4) of Table 2 
 
 
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Effective tax rate 3206 0.443 0.342 0.043 1.932 
Weighted tax rate of neighbors 3242 0.449 0.237 0.057 1.868 
Local CIT sharing ratio 3242 0.245 0.070 0.094 0.438 
GDP per capita 3234 9.671 0.805 7.569 12.722 
Openness 3112 0.196 0.346 0.001 2.297 
Industrialization 3241 0.481 0.122 0.165 0.807 
Urbanization 2779 0.352 0.191 0.100 0.998 
Population density 2790 0.125 0.021 0.084 0.173 
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TABLE 2. Fiscal Incentives and Tax Competition: Main Results 
 Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects + IV 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Weighted tax rate of neighbors 0.576*** 0.537*** 
 
0.649** 0.621** 
 (-7.504) (-6.855)  (-2.208) (-2.01) 
Weighted tax rate of 





 (-1.827) (-2.131)  (-1.695) (-1.819) 
Tax-sharing ratio 0.248* 0.191  -0.915* -0.678* 
 (-1.737) (-1.32)  (-1.725) (-1.721) 
GDP per capita 0.043*** -0.011  -0.048* -0.053* 
 (-3.655) (-0.459)  (-1.733) (-1.851) 
Industrialization 0.001* 0.002**  0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (-1.775) (-2.219)  (-3.246) (-3.248) 
Openness 0.049 0.052  0.032 0.037 
 (-1.517) (-1.605)  (-0.956) (-1.126) 
Urbanization  0.05 0.047 
 
0.069 0.065 
 (-1.049) (-0.996)  (-1.37) (-1.285) 
Population density 0.120*** 0.076**  0.068* 0.059 
 (-3.986) (-2.178)  (-1.958) (-1.64) 
      
City fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Time trends No Yes  No Yes  
Observations 2,760 2,760  2,748 2,748 
R-squared 0.472 0.473  0.431 0.448 
Number of cities 279 279  278 278 
Cragg-Donald F-statistics - -  14.71 12.21 
Hansen test (p-value) - -   0.754 0.742 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 





TABLE 3. Robustness Checks: Alternative Weighting Matrices 
 Weight I  Weight II  Weight III 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Weighted tax rate  0.615** 0.539*  0.609** 0.516*  0.719*** 0.558* 
    of neighbors  (-2.212) (-1.771)  (-2.496) (-1.722)  (-2.788) (-1.743) 
Weighted tax rate*Local CIT 
sharing ratio 
1.51† 1.196†  1.401** 1.314*  1.405** 1.559** 
     (-1.477) (-1.495)  (-2.035) (-1.869)  (-1.961) (-2.082) 
Local CIT sharing ratio -0.687 -0.362  -0.564* -0.411  -0.716** -0.668** 
 (-1.260) (-0.891)  (-1.694) (-1.302)  (-2.064) (-2.011) 
GDP per capita -0.027 -0.032  -0.023 -0.043  -0.047 -0.062** 
 (-0.959) (-1.130)  (-0.819) (-1.502)  (-1.557) (-2.055) 
Industrialization 0.003*** 0.002***  0.003*** 0.003***  0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (-2.708) (-2.616)  (-3.046) (-3.024)  (-3.457) (-3.491) 
Openness 0.028 0.037  0.076** 0.081**  0.094*** 0.095*** 
 (-0.857) (-1.107)  (-2.144) (-2.325)  (-2.592) (-2.687) 
Urbanization  0.049 0.043  0.06 0.053  0.08 0.07 
 (-1.005) (-0.896)  (-1.157) (-1.035)  (-1.503) (-1.316) 
Population density 0.082** 0.070*  0.088** 0.066*  0.075** 0.057 
 (-2.387) (-1.955)  (-2.458) (-1.791)  (-2.009) (-1.514) 
         
City fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Time trends No  Yes  No Yes  No yes 
Observations 2,748 2,748  2,720 2,720  2,720 2,720 
R-squared 0.452 0.467  0.404 0.426  0.377 0.403 
Number of id 278 278  275 275  275 275 





Hansen test (p-value) 0.597 0.612   0.567 0.318   0.359 0.332 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent level, respectively. †represents that the variable is jointly significant at the 5% level. Weight I, Weigh II, 
Weight III represent uniform weights (i.e., the simple average of all other cities in the province), weights based on 
the size of the city economy, and weights based on both geographical distance between two cities and the size of 








 Non-capital cities 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Weighted tax rate of neighbors 0.811*** 0.660**  0.479† 0.503† 
      (-2.721) (-2.027)  (-1.603) (-1.581) 
Weighted tax rate*Local CIT 
sharing ratio 
1.6† 1.596*  2.675** 2.196*** 
    (-1.49) (-1.87)  (-2.537) (-2.608) 
Local CIT sharing ratio -1.058* -0.879*  -1.672*** -1.327*** 
 (-1.764) (-1.833)  (-2.991) (-3.183) 
GDP per capita -0.074** -0.081***  -0.072** -0.075** 
 (-2.449) (-2.652)  (-2.510) (-2.532) 
Industrialization 0.004*** 0.004***  0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (-3.555) (-3.628)  (-4.29) (-4.315) 
Openness 0.056 0.064*  0.001 0.009 
 (-1.542) (-1.78)  (-0.031) (-0.265) 
Urbanization 0.134** 0.125**  0.068 0.066 
 (-2.32) (-2.179)  (-1.261) (-1.234) 
Population density 0.047 0.033  0.06 0.052 
 (-1.249) (-0.821)  (-1.441) (-1.237) 
      
City fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Time trends No Yes  No Yes  
Observations 2,457 2,457  2,512 2,512 
R-squared 0.412 0.439  0.397 0.421 
Number of cities 248 248  254 254 
Cragg-Donald F-statistics 12.13 8.105  13.85 11.79 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.779 0.836   0.738 0.649 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent level, respectively. †represents that the variable is jointly significant at the 5% level. “Non-minority 
provinces” represents the subsample that excludes cities located in minority autonomous provinces. “Non-capital 







TABLE A1. Description of Variables and Sources 
Variable  Definition Source 
Effective tax rate 
The ratio of the total 
corporate income taxes to 
GDP 
the China City Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Weighted tax rate of 
neighbors 
The weighted average of 
effective tax rates of all 
other cities in the same 
province, weighted by 
inverse distance 
Authors’ calculation 
Local CIT sharing ratio 
The ratio of total retained 
corporate income tax 
revenues for all sub-
provincial governments to 
total corporate income tax 
revenues generated in that 
province 
the China Statistical 
Yearbook for Regional 
Economy, the China 
Taxation Yearbook, and 
authors’ calculation 
GDP per capita 
Real GDP per capita the China City Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Openness 
The ratio of imports plus 
exports to GDP 
the China City Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Industrialization 
The share of secondary 
sector in total GDP 
the China City Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Urbanization 
The share of urban 
population in total 
population 
the China City Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Population density 
Population density the China City Statistical 
Yearbooks 
 
 
 
 
 
